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Abstract 
A global crediting mechanism would enable developing countries without binding emissions reduction 
targets to participate in the international carbon market. Linking the framework on Reducing Emissions 
from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (REDD+) as an offset program to major cap-and-trade 
programs is a particularly promising approach to increase both climate finance and cost-efficiency. 
However, the coexistence of permits and offsets also creates a classic case of interaction effects. In this 
paper, we explore how the availability of multiple compliance instruments affects energy investment 
incentives. Alternative trading and linkage schemes are compared using a real options model of firm-
level investment decisions under stochastic prices and the ability to delay investments. We first isolate 
the critical design factors that drive private investments in the energy sector. We then identify policy 
regimes that balance the different concerns in the polarized debate for and against the inclusion of 
forest carbon offsets. 
1. Introduction 
Since the signing of the Warsaw framework on Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest 
Degradation (REDD+), the prospects for a large scale development of REDD+ credits have significantly 
improved (Recio, 2013). At the same time, the discussions regarding a top-down global carbon market 
have faded. In fact, many observers of international negotiations now argue in favor of hybrid 
international treaties combining both bottom-up and top-down approaches (Edenhofer et al., 2013; 
Ranson & Stavins, 2014). While this could be achieved through full linking of existing emissions trading 
schemes, the political appetite for this approach in the short-term is currently not at its highest. This 
deadlock seems to reflect the major barriers that complicate full linking: the need to harmonize levels 
of ambition and to accept (possibly significant) financial flows between jurisdictions but also the fear 
of losing regulatory control and increasing vulnerability to external shocks (Flachsland et al., 2009; 
Green et al., 2014; McKibbin et al., 2008). Nonetheless, with the positive development at the 21st 
Conference of the Parties (COP21) in Paris, it is also likely that further integration between emerging 
GHG pricing schemes in the world will occur and will be perceived as desirable (Bodansky et al., 2014). 
In addition, one may expect that developing economies will demand some degree of support for their 
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mitigation efforts from the rest of the world, including financial transfers. The main tool so far for such 
purposes that linked fragmented carbon markets was the Clean Development Mechanisms (CDM) 
under the Kyoto Protocol. However, as this mechanism is currently in palliative care (Kossoy et al., 
2015) REDD+ could become a new framework towards bottom-up integration of carbon markets. 
REDD+ is a relatively low-cost mitigation option (Busch et al., 2009; Kindermann et al., 2008; Lubowski 
& Rose, 2013) and, therefore, its integration in a global mitigation strategy could allow larger emissions 
reductions and lower overall abatement costs. One option is to link REDD+ as an emission reduction 
credit program unilaterally to major cap-and-trade programs in the EU, US, but also China and Korea 
(Angelsen & Rudel, 2013).1 The crediting mechanism would enable major developing countries without 
binding caps to participate in the international carbon market (Tuerk et al., 2009). In addition, one-way 
linking would significantly strengthen the currently weak demand for REDD+ (Laing et al., 2015) and 
mobilize the funding needed to realize the REDD+ mitigation potential.2 This could also allow building 
operational best practices and the necessary institutions, in particular in developing countries (Green 
et al., 2014; Wehkamp et al., 2015). Such an incremental and polycentric approach to overcome multi-
jurisdictional negotiations (Ostrom, 2009) could be a first step towards a global carbon markets in a 
more distant future (Green et al., 2014). Politically, unilateral linking might be more palatable as 
countries keep more control within their own carbon markets (Tuerk et al., 2009). 
However, the inclusion of REDD+ in the global carbon markets is a highly controversial issue in the 
climate policy debate. The key concern is that the availability of low-cost REDD+ credits – due to the 
low marginal costs of reduced forest emissions – may ‘flood’ the compliance market and ‘crowd out’ 
socially optimal mitigation efforts in other sectors (Fry, 2008; Murray et al., 2009) as well as 
investments and research and development into low carbon technologies (Bosetti et al., 2011; Fuss et 
al., 2011).3 Such disincentives to mitigate and invest could in fact threaten the dynamic efficiency of 
the market and increase the overall costs of achieving long-term decarbonization targets.4 Therefore, 
it is of high importance to assess the relevant design factors that determine the impact of an inclusion 
of REDD+ credits in a mandatory pollution control system. 
In this paper, we explore how the availability of multiple compliance instruments, permits and credits, 
affects an energy producer’s incentive to invest in low-carbon technology. Alternative emissions 
trading schemes and linkage designs are compared using a real options model of firm-level investment 
decisions (Dixit & Pindyck, 1994) characterized by dependent and uncertain price paths for permits 
and credits. More specifically, our model is calibrated to the stylized features of a wide range of existing 
                                                          
1 Cap-and-trade systems set a binding, absolute cap on total emissions, but allow for trade of permits between 
regulated entities. In contrast, credit systems define a certain baseline, such as an absolute business-as-usual 
projection, and only allow emission reductions that go beyond this baseline to be used as sellable credits (often 
referred to as offsets). 
2 Otherwise international funding for REDD+ would have to be raised either in form of public funds (e.g., official 
development aid), voluntary contributions or a separate market for REDD credits. See for more details, (Angelsen 
& Rudel, 2013). 
3 Looking at the experience of the EU ETS, the large import of CER credits is one of the factors often blamed for 
the price collapse (e.g. European Commission, 2014; Neuhoff et al., 2012). CER prices have indeed been 
persistently below EUA prices. Empirical evidence for this claim is however weak (Koch et al., 2014). 
4 Other concerns that are, however, outside the scope of the paper are the establishment of a reliable system to 
measure, report and verify (MRV) and the setting of appropriate reference levels, with associated issues of 
additionality, permanence and leakage (Kerr, 2013; Lubowski & Rose, 2013). 
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and emerging cap-and-trade programs in the EU, US, New Zealand and Korea. They differ inter alia in 
terms of price stabilization mechanisms (e.g. price floor) and credit quotas (e.g. 13.4 % in EU ETS).5 In 
addition, we explore alternative REDD+ pricing schemes discussed in the literature (e.g. indexed to 
carbon prices or opportunity costs of conservation as in Engel et al., 2015)6 and how they affect the 
demand for REDD+ beyond the imposed quota by policy makers. Our aim is to identify linked policy 
regimes that balance the different concerns in the polarized debate for and against inclusion. This is 
undertaken by isolating the critical design factors that drive private investments into the 
transformation of the energy infrastructure. 
In a nutshell, we model a representative agent in the energy sector who owns an old coal-fired power 
plant (as representative for cheap power plants with high emissions as in Szolgayova et al., 2008). This 
power plant can but does not have to be replaced by a wind park – representing all renewable 
technologies with high investment costs but no emissions. Similar to Fuss et al. (2011) the agent can 
surrender permits and offsets for compliance, but we introduce two novel model features consistent 
with real world policy schemes. First, the agent can decide how many REDD+ credits she will surrender, 
yet, this choice is subject to restrictions. Second, permit and credit prices are both assumed to be 
stochastic following two correlated Geometric Brownian Motions (GBM). Therefore, the REDD+ quota 
alone is not sufficient for explaining credit usage. We conduct several experiments using, amongst 
others, different values for the correlation parameter and the offset quota. We then deduce the 
agent’s optimal strategy in terms of the chosen power plant type and the share of REDD+ credits. This 
enables us to explore how the policy design affects the agent’s incentive either to invest in a low-
carbon power plant or to postpone such an investment due to the option value of the fossil-based 
power plant. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 introduces the real option methodology 
and provides information on data used for calibration. In section 3, the results are discussed. Section 
4 concludes with policy implications. 
2. Model section  
Consider an electricity producer with a finite planning horizon of 50 years (𝑇 = 50). The electricity 
producer owns an old coal fired power plant (as representative for cheap power plants with high 
emissions and production based on fossil fuels), which he can either continue or replace by an offshore 
wind park, representing all renewable technologies with high investment costs but no emissions and 
relatively lower operating costs. The electricity producer can only own one power plant in each time 
period. 
The operating profit of the power plant at time 𝑡 depending on its type (𝑎𝑡) can be represented by 
Equation 1: 
𝜋𝑃𝑃(𝑎𝑡 , 𝑃𝑡
𝐸) = 𝑄 ∙ 𝑃𝑡
𝐸 − 𝐹𝐶(𝑎𝑡) − 𝑄 ∙ 𝑂𝐶(𝑎𝑡) 
where 𝑄 is the quantity produced by the power plant. We normalize the size of each of the different 
power plant types to an annual electricity output of 7,446 MWh per year, which corresponds to a 
capacity of 1MW at an availability factor of 85%. Thus, 𝑄 is independent of the chosen power plant 
                                                          
5 See Hood (2010) and Kossoy et al. (2014) for a review of existing and emerging emissions trading programs. 
6 See Engel et al. (2008) for an overview. 
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type. Furthermore, we assume a constant load factor for each power plant, which especially for 
renewable technologies might lead to a small positive bias (see e.g. Reuter et al., 2012; Szolgayova et 
al., 2008). 𝑃𝐸 is the constant price of electricity, which the electricity producer earns per unit produced. 
The fixed (investment) costs depending on the chosen power plant are denoted by 𝐹𝐶(𝑎𝑡). We 
annualize the capital costs, representing a situation where the overnight construction costs are 
covered by a loan with annualized capital costs being the yearly instalments of such a loan at 5% 
interest. 𝑂𝐶(𝑎𝑡) represents the (constant) operating costs of power plant type 𝑎𝑡. The fixed and 
operating costs are based on IEA (2010) and shown in Table 1. 
 
Table 1 - Cost of electricity production depending on type of power plant 
Power plant type (𝑎𝑡) Annualized fixed 
investment costs,      
𝐹𝐶(𝑎𝑡) 
Operating costs, 
𝑂𝐶(𝑎𝑡) 
Greenhouse gas 
emissions per MWh, 
𝐺𝐻𝐺(𝑎𝑡) 
Coal-fired power plant 60,825 US$/year 28 US$/MWh 6,552 t CO2/year 
Wind farm 312,563 US$/year 23.63 US$/MWh 0 t CO2/year 
Notes: All types are normalized to an annual electricity output of 7,446 MWh, calculated from IEA (2010) 
 
2.1 Regulated market environment 
In our setting, the electricity producer is placed in a regulated market environment, similar to the EU 
ETS scheme. Thus the electricity producer is obliged to cover his greenhouse gas emissions, which are 
emitted during the production process. In our case the electricity producer is offered two options to 
cover his emissions: 
1. Carbon permits 
2. REDD+ credits 
The prices of both certificates are assumed to be stochastic and correlated, with 𝑃𝑡
𝑃  being the price of 
carbon permits at time 𝑡 and 𝑃𝑡
𝑅 the price of REDD+ credits. For each unit of emission the electricity 
producer needs to buy either a corresponding unit of carbon permit or REDD+ credit. Note that we use 
the terms credits and offsets interchangeably. The total cost from covering carbon emissions of the 
electricity producer can be represented as 𝐶𝐶 in Equation 2: 
𝐶𝐶(𝑎𝑡 , 𝛿𝑡 , 𝑃𝑡
𝑃 , 𝑃𝑡
𝑅) = 𝑄 ∙ 𝐺𝐻𝐺(𝑎𝑡) ∙ [(1 − 𝛿𝑡) ∙ 𝑃𝑡
𝑃 + 𝛿𝑡 ∙ 𝑃𝑡
𝑅] 
where 𝐺𝐻𝐺(𝑎𝑡) is the relative amount of greenhouse gas emissions emitted per unit of output (𝑄) 
depending on the type of power plant used (𝑎𝑡). 𝛿𝑡  is the share of total emissions covered by REDD+ 
credits at time 𝑡. Consistent with real world trading schemes, policy makers can restrict the amount of 
REDD+ credits by setting a relative quota (𝛿𝑡 ≤ 𝛿̅
𝑅). 
An important model feature is that we endogenize the REDD+ usage parameter 𝛿𝑡, i.e. the agent can 
decide how many REDD+ credits she will surrender. Prior modelling builds on the assumption that all 
available offsets are used by the firm (Fuss et al., 2011) as it is usually argued that firms have strong 
incentives to surrender the maximum amount of credits allowed, precisely because credits are cheaper 
than permits (e.g. Fry, 2008). However, such offset usage behavior is inconsistent with empirical 
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evidence. For instance, Naegele (2015) shows that almost a quarter of the regulated entities in the EU 
ETS do not surrender any CDM offsets and only 50% of the firms surrender CDM offsets up to the 
maximum allowed (see also Braun et al., 2014). In our model it is the stochastic nature of permit and 
offset prices that drives the offset usage behavior. 
2.2 Price processes 
As we investigate the consequences of different carbon certificate price scenarios, we do not want 
parts of our results driven by a stochastic electricity price. Therefore, we assume that the electricity 
price (𝑃𝑡
𝐸) is constant over the planning horizon at 50 US$/MWh, which falls within the range of current 
spot market prices for the major EU exchanges.  
The prices of carbon permits and REDD+ credits on the other hand are assumed to be stochastic and 
correlated. Equation 3 shows the price processes following Geometric Brownian Motions (GBM) for 
carbon permits (𝑃𝑡
𝑃) and REDD+ credits (𝑃𝑡
𝑅). 
𝑑𝑃𝑡
𝑃 = 𝜇𝑃𝑃𝑡
𝑃𝑑𝑡 + 𝜎𝑃𝑃𝑡
𝑃𝑑𝑊𝑡
𝑃 
𝑑𝑃𝑡
𝑅 = 𝜇𝑅𝑃𝑡
𝑅𝑑𝑡 + 𝜎𝑅𝑃𝑡
𝑅𝑑𝑊𝑡
𝑅 
Where 𝜇𝑃and 𝜇𝑅 are the drift of the price process respectively, 𝜎𝑃 and 𝜎𝑅 are volatility parameters 
and 𝑑𝑊𝑡
𝑃 and 𝑑𝑊𝑡
𝑅 represent the increment of a Wiener process for carbon permits and REDD+ 
credits, respectively. We assume the two increments of the Wiener processes to be correlated, where 
the correlation parameter is denoted by 𝜌.  
The respective parameters used in our analysis are shown in Table 2. Given the lack of reliable long-
term data for carbon prices,7 we resort to shadow price calculations taken from the recent IPCC AR5 
report. The IPCC shadow price paths are based on multiple Integrated Assessment Models (IAMs) for 
a 450 ppm GHG stabilization target, which is associated with a relatively higher probability of 
maintaining warming below 2 degrees C above pre-industrial levels. It is important to note that these 
models are based on different assumptions on stylized socioeconomic factors (such as demographic 
transformation or technological developments). For the drift estimate, we use the average trend 
implied by the shadow price trajectories across models up to 2050, which is about 7%. For the volatility 
parameter, we base the estimate on the spread of the different scenarios involved (i.e. standard 
deviation across IAMs, which amounts to 18%). Thus, we implicitly assume that the IAM scenarios span 
the relevant states of the world. However, we acknowledge that this might deviate from reality to 
some extent and thus conduct additional experiments with regards to the uncertainty parameter to 
also account for a regime with significantly lower as well as higher volatility (set arbitrarily to 10% and 
30%). Motivated by the fact that offset schemes such as REDD+ by their nature also involve project 
risks (Dormady & Englander, 2015) we consistently assume a higher volatility for credits. More 
specifically, the volatility increment (by factor 1/3) is aligned with the observable difference between 
price fluctuations in existing permit (EU ETS) and credit (CDM) markets. 
Finally, the correlation parameter is calibrated to reflect two distinct market scenarios. A high 
correlation between permit and credits prices would be present if the REDD+ scheme was integrated 
                                                          
7 Observable market prices for carbon in existing cap-and-trade programs, such as the EU ETS, have been volatile 
and low (Newell et al., 2014). It is highly questionable whether these market prices ensure the attainment of 
long-term climate policy goals (Grosjean et al., 2014; Knopf et al., 2014) .    
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in the global carbon market as it is currently the case for CDM. A low correlation would be present if 
REDD+ remains a segmented market, in which REDD+ prices mainly reflect opportunity costs (OC) of 
other land use (i.e. forgone agricultural returns). 
Table 2 - Parameters of price processes 
 Starting price 
per ton CO2 
Drift (𝜇) Volatility (𝜎) Correlation () 
Base Low High Low High 
Permits 10 US$8 7%9 18%10 10% 30% 
0.111 0.812 
Credits 4 US$13 7%14 24%15 13% 40% 
 
In addition to various assumptions about the price process and the correlation of the two, policy 
makers can decide to implement price floors or bands to steer the investment activity of producers. 
Equation 4 incorporates the minimum (𝑃𝑃, 𝑃𝑅) and maximum (?̅?𝑃, ?̅?𝑅) prices set by policy makers. 
𝑃𝑡
𝑃 = min (max(𝑃𝑡
𝑃 , 𝑃𝑃) , ?̅?𝑃) 
𝑃𝑡
𝑅 = min(max(𝑃𝑡
𝑅 , 𝑃𝑅) , ?̅?𝑅) 
 
2.3 Optimal control problem 
The total profit of the electricity producer at time 𝑡 is represented in Equation 5: 
𝜋(𝑎𝑡 , 𝛿𝑡 , 𝑃𝑡
𝐸 , 𝑃𝑡
𝑃 , 𝑃𝑡
𝑅) = 𝜋𝑃𝑃(𝑎𝑡, 𝑃𝑡
𝐸) − 𝐶𝐶(𝑎𝑡 , 𝛿𝑡 , 𝑃𝑡
𝑃 , 𝑃𝑡
𝑅) 
                     = 𝑄 ∙ [𝑃𝑡
𝐸 − 𝑂𝐶(𝑎𝑡) − 𝐺𝐻𝐺(𝑎𝑡) ∙  [(1 − 𝛿𝑡) ∙ 𝑃𝑡
𝑃 + 𝛿𝑡 ∙ 𝑃𝑡
𝑅]] − 𝐹𝐶(𝑎𝑡) 
Under the assumptions described above the producer’s problem can be formulated as  
max
𝑎𝑡,𝛿𝑡
𝐸 [∑
1
(1+𝑟)𝑡
𝜋(𝑎𝑡 , 𝛿𝑡 , 𝑃𝑡
𝐸 , 𝑃𝑡
𝑃 , 𝑃𝑡
𝑅)𝑇𝑡=1 ] 
𝑎0 = 1 
𝑎𝑡 = 𝑎𝑡−19 ∀𝑡 
                                                          
8 Based on the price floor in the Californian ETS and roughly in line with 2010 price in REMIND 1.5 AMPERE2-450-
FullTech-OPT (=12$/ton CO2) and other models. 
9 Based on the average exponential growth rate of shadow prices in the following models: REMIND 1.5 
(AMPERE2-450-FullTech-OPT); MESSAGE V.4 (AMPERE2-450-FullTech-OPT); IMAGE 2.4 (AMPERE2-450-FullTech-
OPT); GCAM 3.1 (LIMITS-450). We exclude those models that predict skyrocketing shadow prices (namely AIM-
Enduse, WITCH_LIMITS and POLES EMF27). 
10 Based on the shadow price volatility across models specified above. 
11 Historical correlation between soy and EUAs over the period 2008-2012 is 0.06. Source: ICE Futures 
12 Historical correlation between EUAs and CERs over the period 2008-2012 is 0.74. Source: ICE Futures 
13 Based on 2010 prices for forestry offsets according to Cal ARB. 
14 The value of 7% is consistent with a REDD price of ~16 in 2030 = global average price in Kindermann et al. 
(2008) for a 50% reduction in deforestation. 
15 We assume that the credit volatility is by one third higher than the carbon shadow price volatility. The factor 
1/3 reflects the observed higher price volatility of CERs over EUAs. Source: ICE Futures 
(4) 
(5) 
(6) 
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𝛿𝑡 ≤ 𝛿̅
𝑅 
𝑃𝑡
𝐸 = 𝑃𝐸̅̅ ̅̅  
𝑑𝑃𝑡
𝑃 = 𝜇𝑃𝑃𝑡
𝑃𝑑𝑡 + 𝜎𝑃𝑃𝑡
𝑃𝑑𝑊𝑡
𝑃 
𝑃𝑡
𝑃 = min (max(𝑃𝑡
𝑃 , 𝑃𝑃) , ?̅?𝑃) 
𝑑𝑃𝑡
𝑅 = 𝜇𝑅𝑃𝑡
𝑅𝑑𝑡 + 𝜎𝑅𝑃𝑡
𝑅𝑑𝑊𝑡
𝑅 
𝑃𝑡
𝑅 = min (max(𝑃𝑡
𝑅 , 𝑃𝑅) , ?̅?𝑅) 
𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑟(𝑑𝑊𝑡
𝑃 , 𝑑𝑊𝑡
𝑅) = 𝜌 
where 𝑟 is the subjective discount rate and 
1
(1+𝑟)𝑡
 is the discount factor, i.e. the factor by which future 
profits to be received at time 𝑡 must be multiplied in order to obtain the present value and which we 
fix at 5% for our analysis as is common practice in such analyses (cf. Reuter et al., 2012). The direction 
of the results does not change significantly for variations of this, however. 
𝑃𝑡
𝑃 and 𝑃𝑡
𝑅 are the state variables and 𝑎𝑡 and 𝛿𝑡  the control variables that represent the choice of 
power plant type electricity producer and the share of REDD+ credits purchased respectively. Note 
that investment into a power plant is a long-lived investment, which we take into account by allowing 
for scrapping of old equipment only after 20 years. 
The producer thus needs to find the optimal strategy combinations {𝑎𝑡 , 𝛿𝑡}𝑡=1
𝑇 . The optimum decision 
in each year can be obtained recursively by solving the Bellman equation: 
 
𝑉𝑡(𝑃𝑡
𝑃, 𝑃𝑡
𝑅) = max
𝑎𝑡,𝛿𝑡
{𝜋(𝑎𝑡 , 𝛿𝑡 , 𝑃𝑡
𝐸 , 𝑃𝑡
𝑃 , 𝑃𝑡
𝑅) + (1 + 𝑟)−1𝐸[𝑉𝑡+1(𝑃𝑡+1
𝑃 , 𝑃𝑡+1
𝑅 )|𝑃𝑡
𝑃 , 𝑃𝑡
𝑅]} 
The equation can be solved by recursive dynamic programming. We then use the matrix of optimal 
decisions for each combination of states to derive statistics for the results. In particular, we simulate 
10,000 price paths in order to obtain distributions of the investment frequencies and the associated 
profits, for example. 
3 Results 
3.1 Benchmark simulations: basic economics of permit-offset linkage  
To begin with, we examine model settings with the full (unrestricted) inclusion of REDD+ offsets in the 
cap-and-trade program. We simulate these unrestricted settings under different market environments 
– i.e. permit and REDD+ price regimes – and compare our simulation results to a corresponding 
scenario with no offsets as a benchmark (later denoted as “No REDD+” scenario). Our emphasis in this 
first results section is on advancing the understanding about how the market environment – 
independent of policy design – determines the extent to which (i) low-carbon technology is crowded 
out (3.1.1) and (ii) REDD+ can be helpful in hedging the transition from coal to wind (3.1.2). 
Six market environment scenarios were constructed that result from the combination of different 
volatility and correlation regimes for permit and offset prices (Table 3). First, we consider the three 
alternative volatility levels for the two certificate price processes discussed above: (a) low volatility, (b) 
medium volatility, and (c) high volatility regime (see Table 2 for the specific parameter calibration). 
Second, as already outlined, we considered two alternative correlations between the two certificate 
(7) 
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prices: (1) We would observe a high positive correlation between permit and REDD+ prices if REDD+ 
schemes were integrated in the global carbon market as it is currently the case for CDM.16 This would 
most likely result in strong co-movements of permit and offset prices (in the following “market-based 
REDD+”). (2) A low positive correlation would reflect the situation of a segmented sectoral REDD+ 
market, in which REDD+ prices mainly reflect landowners' opportunity costs (OC) of conserving forest 
(i.e. forgone agricultural returns). This “OC-based REDD+” approach would imply a weak price 
dependency between permits and offsets.  
Our baseline is the medium volatility and high correlation combination (S-1 in Table 3) which reflects 
a market-based REDD+ approach and a price volatility in line with the spread over current predictions 
by IAMs.  
Table 3 - Overview of price scenarios 
  Correlation regime 
  High Low 
V
o
latility re
gim
e 
Medium 
 
Market-based REDD+ 
(S-1) 
OC-based REDD+ 
(S-2) 
Low Market-based REDD+/ low uncertainty 
(S-3) 
OC-based REDD+/ low uncertainty 
(S-4) 
High Market-based REDD+/ high uncertainty 
(S-5) 
OC-based REDD+/ high uncertainty 
(S-6) 
 
3.1.1 Investment behavior  
We first address the question how investment behavior and, in particular, the transition to wind energy 
is influenced by the (unrestricted) inclusion of REDD+ credits. Figure 1 presents the simulated 
frequency of wind investment over the planning horizon for the six market environment scenarios S-1 
to S-6 (colored lines). To facilitate comparisons, we also plot the results of our benchmark model 
without offsets (black line).17 
A comparison of the settings with and without the full inclusion of REDD+ illustrates the crowding-out 
effect of relatively cheap offsets: while investment in wind is increasing over time in both cases, the 
speed of transition as well as the magnitude of wind investments are higher when the firm does not 
have the option to use REDD+ credits. For instance, under the medium volatility regime, without 
REDD+, investment into wind starts after period 5 and reaches about 85% at the end of the planning 
horizon, while with REDD+, investments unfold only after period 10 and the wind investment share 
remains close to 50%.  
However, a second important finding is that the strength of crowding out effect hinges critically on the 
volatility of the two certificate prices. We observe a significantly higher (lower) wind investment 
probability under the low (high) volatility regime. In fact, with less volatile permit and REDD+ prices, 
the wind investment share also reaches about 85% (as in the case without REDD+ in the medium 
                                                          
16 It is noteworthy that market integration is ultimately the result of (several) policy decisions to accept offsets 
in compliance markets. This implies also that the acceptance of offsets in a single and relatively small market (say 
Swiss ETS) would not lead to integrated markets.   
17 For the sake of brevity, we only show the no REDD+ case for the medium volatility regime. 
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volatility regime). Still, the transition to the clean technology is delayed until around period 20 as the 
possibility to resort to REDD+ credits gives the investor the flexibility to reap the option value of 
delaying the transition. In contrast, a market environment with highly volatile permit and credit prices 
bears the risk of a long-term carbon lock-in, which is reflected by our finding that the wind investment 
frequency in the high-volatility scenarios stagnates at around 10-20%. An important side question is 
whether permit or credit price fluctuations drive the volatility effect that we observe with respect to 
investment. To clarify, we also run simulations reducing only the permit or credit price volatility. Figure 
A1 in the appendix shows that it is, indeed, the REDD+ price volatility that is almost exclusively driving 
the result, while the impact of permit price variability is negligible.  
Figure 1 - Investment probability
 
The impact of price volatility on the investment behavior is obviously what we would expect from real 
options theory (Dixit & Pindyck, 1994): high uncertainties about the future path of carbon prices induce 
investors to wait until uncertainty has been resolved (Fuss et al., 2009). Or, to put it in other words, 
investors will be more willing to invest into capital-intensive low-carbon technologies if carbon prices 
are more certain. Yet, we believe that this result is highly underappreciated in the REDD+ controversy 
that fails to relate the strength of the crowding-out effect to the state of price volatility. In addition, 
we have shown that it is mainly the credit price variability that matters. Since credits are less expensive 
than permits, firms will in general have incentives to use credits for compliance, which in turn explains 
why credit price uncertainty is the critical factor for investment decisions. Acknowledging the volatility 
effect would result in a more balanced view on the adverse impact of REDD+ on low-carbon 
investments. In addition, it has an important policy implication, since it indicates that specific price 
stabilization mechanisms are more likely to be effective in inducing low-carbon investment than 
excluding REDD+ completely as a compliance option. We will explore this policy option in 3.2.  
The third interesting finding from Figure 1 is that the degree of correlation between the two price 
processes has only a modest impact on the amount of wind investment. In general, we observe more 
wind investment under the high-correlation regime (i.e. in the case of market-based REDD+) and this 
effect is more pronounced in more volatile price regimes. However, the correlation effect remains in 
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the single digits (2-9%) and almost disappears in the low-volatility setting. Our finding is consistent 
with the standard real option prediction: under a low price correlation (i.e. in the case of OC-based 
REDD+) offset usage becomes more attractive because it may offer risk diversification opportunities 
(that, in turn, increase with volatility) and, thus, the crowding out of wind investment is more 
pronounced. The policy implication from this observation is that a market-based (rather than OC-
based) REDD+ mechanism is more likely to be effective in inducing low-carbon investments. 
Finally, the REDD+ offset usage behavior in our simulations is noteworthy. As discussed above, our 
model does not deterministically imply that all available offsets are used by the firm. Instead, our 
simulations rather suggest mixed strategies in REDD+ usage, which is in line with empirical findings in 
Naegele (2015) and Braun et al. (2014). Figure 2 shows our results for the offset usage in the baseline 
scenario (S-1).18 Using all credits is a dominant strategy in the early periods of the 50-year planning 
horizon. However, the firm gradually switches to a strategy of using some but not all REDD+ credits. 
Finally, towards the end of the planning period we find a gradual phase-out of credit usage and using 
no credits becomes the dominant strategy, as the transition to wind gets completed.  
Figure 2 - Variation in REDD+ usage with market-based REDD+ and medium volatility
 
3.1.2 Profit distribution 
While analyzing the impact of low-carbon investment is important from the perspective of a 
policymaker, who wants to effectively reduce emissions, the framework used here also enables us to 
say something about the costs and benefits of firms of doing so in different ways. Therefore, in addition 
to the (adverse) effect on wind investments, we seek to shed light on the (favorable) risk hedging effect 
of REDD+. In fact, Fuss et al. (2011) show that the inclusion of REDD+ in an emissions trading program 
can help to smooth out carbon price fluctuations, thereby reducing the risks that producers might be 
exposed to. Our simulations reinforce this finding and provide further insights into the role of the 
market environment in terms of volatility and correlation regimes for permit and offset prices.  
Figure 3 shows the profit distributions for the case without an REDD+ offset scheme (Panel A) and for 
several cases where REDD+ credits can be bought (Panel B, C, and D). The figure clearly shows that the 
                                                          
18 Results for the other market environment scenarios are qualitatively very similar and not reported for the sake 
of brevity. 
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inclusion of REDD+ has a positive effect on profits: not only the average level of profits increases 
significantly but also the risk (i.e. standard deviation) associated with the profit flows decreases. As 
expected, we find a more narrow profit distribution in the setting with a low price volatility (relative 
to the medium volatility regime; see Panel B and D). In line with expectations, we also find that the risk 
diversification effect is (slightly) more pronounced under a low-correlation regime (Panel C). In other 
words, profits are more certain under an OC-based REDD+ approach but the effect of the permit-credit 
correlation in general remains limited. 
Figure 3 - Profit distributions  
A: No REDD+
 
 
B: Market-based / medium volatility (S-1) 
 
 
C: OC-based / medium volatility (S-2) 
 
 
D: Market-based / low volatility (S-3) 
 
 
 
3.2 Policy simulations: design options for permit-offset linkage 
Subsequently, we examine model settings with specific policy options that can be introduced when a 
REDD+ offset scheme and a cap-and-trade program are linked. Our emphasis in this part of the results 
section is on identifying policy regimes that may balance the adverse crowding-out effect with the 
favorable risk hedging effect of REDD+. To this end, we first deviate from the prior assumption of a full 
and unrestricted inclusion of REDD+ offsets. Instead, we introduce offset quotas (3.2.1). Second, we 
introduce price stabilization mechanisms with both a price floor and a price ceiling for certificates, 
which is a widely unexplored policy option in the context of permit-offset linkage (3.2.2). Finally, we 
combine both policy options and explore the effects of a policy regime with price collar and offset use 
limitations (3.2.3). All following experiments are built on the baseline scenario S-1, reflecting a market-
based REDD+ approach and price volatility in line with IAM predictions. 
3.2.1 Quota policy 
We have assumed hitherto that the offset usage is not restricted by policymakers. We now extend the 
basic model allowing for offset quotas. In fact, the full inclusion of REDD+ or other offsets is rarely 
observed in real-world cap-and-trade programs. Instead, most existing and planned cap-and-trade 
schemes restrict the quantity of offsets usable by firms. Offset quotas are mainly motivated as a means 
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of ensuring that the bulk of emission reduction is achieved within the emissions trading system 
(Trotignon, 2012).  
Table 4 gives an overview of offset entitlement rules in different cap-and-trade programs. Although 
the exact definition of quantity limits varies across programs, we generally observe a relatively low 
offset quota between around 3% and 13% of the cap in almost all legislated programs. The New 
Zealand Emissions Trading Scheme (NZ ETS) is the only legislated program with unlimited offset 
usage.19 Interestingly, the offset quota of 30% in the proposed federal US cap-and-trade system – the 
Waxman-Markey bill – was relatively high. A high offset quota of up to 50% is also planned in a future 
trading phase (2021-2025) of the Korean ETS. Similarly, Brazil and Mexico commit to emissions 
reductions through avoided deforestation in their Intended Nationally Determined Contributions 
(INDCs) and relatively high offset quotas could be expected for potential trading or tax schemes in 
these countries. 
Table 4 - Overview of quota scenarios 
REDD+ quota Example 
≤5% Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI)  [2009-]    3.3% 
≤10% California Cap-and-Trade Program  [2013-] 8%  
EU ETS  [2013-2020] varies 
Korean ETS  [2015-2020] 10% 
Swiss ETS  [2008-] 8% 
Quebec Cap-and-Trade System [2013-] 8% 
≤15% Australian Clean Energy Act  [2012-] 12.5% 
EU ETS  [2008-2012] 13.4% 
≤30% US Waxman-Markey bill  [2013] 30% 
≤50% Korean ETS  [2021-2025] 50% 
100% New Zealand ETS  [2008-] unlimited 
Source: (ICAP, 2015; Newell et al., 2014; Ranson & Stavins, 2014) 
In order to reflect the observed quota policy in our modeling, we implement four stylized policy 
scenarios with a 5%, 10%, 30% and 50% offset quota. Panel A of Figure 4 shows how the investment 
behavior is influenced by the existence of an offset quota by comparing the four quota simulations 
with the no-quota baseline and the no-offset scenario. The key finding from this experiment is that 
offset use limitations significantly reduce the crowding-out effect of REDD+. With a relatively low 
quota, as legislated in most ETS, the crowding-out risk is indeed negligible. Under a 10% offset quota, 
the wind investment share throughout the planning horizon is very close to the case without REDD+. 
Interestingly, we observe only a slightly higher wind investment probability under a 5% quota.  
 
 
 
 
                                                          
19 This policy design can partly be explained by the central fact that in New Zealand’s program no auctions are 
held and regulated firms comply with any unmet permit need by purchasing offsets. 
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Figure 4 - Investment probability under different policy scenarios 
Panel A: with REDD+ quota
 
Panel B: with price collar
 
Panel C: with quota and price collar
 
14 
 
This has important policy implications: the benefits of introducing very low quotas or decreasing the 
quota from an already low level can be limited in terms of preventing crowding-out effects. Our 
simulations indeed suggest that 10% would be a sufficient restriction if policymakers are concerned 
about the crowding-out of low-carbon investments. While a relatively low quota would not stipulate 
more wind investments, it would, however, restrict the beneficial risk hedging effect thus decreasing 
the cost of the transition to low-carbon technologies to society.20 To illustrate this trade-off, Panel A 
of Figure 5 shows the profit distribution in a setting with a 10% and 50% quota (in addition to the 
benchmark without REDD+). The simulations highlight that the level of profits is increasing and the risk 
of profits is decreasing in the offset quota. In fact, the profit distribution with a 50% quota is very 
similar to the distribution in a setting with unlimited REDD+ usage (see Panel B in Figure 3), while the 
distribution with a 10% quota partly overlaps with the benchmark distribution without REDD+. 
3.2.2 Price stabilization policy 
In virtually all emissions trading programs policy makers have been concerned about permit prices that 
are either too low or too high (Goulder, 2013). A particular concern relates to the potential difficulties 
of firms to make investment decisions when the prices of permits (and the associated costs of 
compliance and abatement) are volatile and subject to uncertainty (see e.g. Blyth et al., 2007; Hepburn, 
2006). The idea that significant swings in permit prices should be avoided, led many cap-and-trade 
program designers (e.g. in California, RGGI and Australia) to include mechanisms to stabilize permit 
prices at economically and politically tolerable levels. The most obvious provision to limit price 
variations is to set a price floor and ceiling, i.e. a so-called price collar. This type of price stabilization 
mechanism is investigated in this section.  
Price collars could in principle be implemented either in the cap-and-trade market (i.e. for permits) or 
in the offset scheme (i.e. for credits). For permits, the price ceiling is achieved through provision of 
more allowances at a predetermined price, while the regulator could set a price floor either through a 
minimum auction reserve price or through commitment to buy and retire allowances at the 
predetermined floor price (Fell et al., 2012a). Credit price collars/floors have been considered e.g. in 
the context of the Australian emissions trading scheme, where one option of implementing such a 
floor would have been to require a fee on conversion of an offset into a unit equivalent to a domestic 
permit, if the price of the offset is below the floor price. Alternatively, an Australian government 
agency could have bought offsets at going rates and sold to domestic emitters at the same price as the 
market price or reserve price for Australian permits (Jotzo, 2011).  
We model both price stabilization options. For the sake of analysis, we consider a permit and credit 
floor of  𝑃𝑃 = 5 US$/ton CO2 and 𝑃𝑅 = 2 US$/ton CO2, respectively (i.e. 50% of the respective 
starting price). The ceiling is set to ?̅?𝑃 = ?̅?𝑅 = 40 US$/ton CO2. In line with real-world price collars, 
these price levels increase over time (by 5% p.a.).21 Given our above finding that low volatility regimes 
are conducive to low-carbon investments, the introduction of price collars in general should have a 
positive impact on wind investments. However, we have also shown that it is the credit price volatility 
that is almost exclusively driving the result. It is precisely for this reason interesting to investigate the 
                                                          
20 We do not discuss the REDD+ offset usage in the quota policy scenarios because they simply reflect the patterns 
observed in section 3.1.2. 
21 We have also experimented with different calibrations (in particular, a higher floor price), but results remain 
qualitatively similar. 
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effects of a credit price collar.  
Panel B of Figure 4 shows the wind investment behavior for the two price collar scenarios (and for 
comparison again the results from the no-quota baseline and the no-offset benchmark). While the 
permit price collar has only a very limited effect on the probability to invest in wind, the credit price 
collar leads to a significantly higher wind investment share. With a minimum and maximum price for 
REDD+, the wind investment share reaches about 75% (compared to 85% in the case without REDD+). 
Yet, similar to the effect of lower volatility regime, the transition to the clean technology is delayed, as 
long as the option value exceeds the costs of waiting; the higher wind investment activity can only be 
observed after around period 30. These findings are in line with the above observation that the REDD+ 
price volatility dominates the investment effect, while the impact of permit price variability is 
negligible. Recall that the underlying reason for this asymmetry is that firms will in general have 
incentives to use the less expensive credits for compliance, which in turn explains why credit price 
uncertainty is the critical factor for investment decisions.  
Panel B of Figure 5 also illustrates the benefits of REDD+ price collars in terms of risk diversification. 
We find that the impact of a price stabilization provision on firm’s profits is very limited. Indeed, the 
profit distributions with and without an offset price collar are almost identical. The introduction of the 
price collar mainly seems to cut the extreme right tail of the distribution, reflecting the presence of the 
minimum price. Taken together, our results indicate that price stabilization mechanisms have strong 
positive effects on the investment behavior, while the impact on the profit spread is negligible. It is 
noteworthy that this impact is in contrast to the effect of a quota policy: with an offset quota there is 
a trade-off between higher wind investments and the profitability of firms.  
While the finding that a price collar helps incentivizing investments in innovations is well established, 
we believe that our investigation of price collars in pollution control system with multiple compliance 
instruments (permits and credits) provides some new perspectives. To date only permit price collars 
are implemented in real-world cap-and-trade programs. We have shown, however, that in a policy 
regime in which offsets are relatively cheaper than permits, the classical permit price collar will not 
effectively change investment behavior. This finding reflects the fact that in a stylized real options 
model it is the volatility of the cheaper compliance instrument that is the driving force for investment. 
Under these conditions, a price collar for credits emerges as a largely overlooked policy option to foster 
investment incentives.22 From a political economy perspective, this is particularly interesting finding 
because the institutional feasibility of a price collar in an offset scheme rather than a cap-and-trade 
program may be significantly higher. Prior research indeed identified political feasibility as the major 
problem for the implementation of a permit price collar.23 This is because a price collar in an ETS may 
be interpreted as a tax; taxes however, as all fiscal measures, are subject to unanimity rules or 
supermajority requirements. It seems questionable whether a similar tax interpretation of a price 
collar in an offset scheme such as REDD+ is tenable. In the case of an offset scheme, it is rather likely 
that the benefits of providing a steady source of revenue are paramount, which may increase the 
political acceptability of a credit price collar. 
                                                          
22 A notable exception is (Fell et al., 2012b) who explore an offset price collar mechanism in a dynamic abatement 
cost model. 
23 Recent discussions in the EU ETS are a prime example for the limited political feasibility of permit price collars 
(Knopf et al., 2014). 
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Figure 5 - Profit distribution under different policy scenarios 
Panel A: with REDD+ quota
 
Panel B: with price collar
 
Panel C: with quota and price collar
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3.2.3 Combination 
Finally, we consider the combination of an offset use limitation and a price collar. Given our finding 
that low offset quotas have beneficial features in terms of investment incentives but adverse effect on 
profits, we are particularly interested whether a combination of a higher offset quota with an offset 
price collar could deliver both investment incentives and risk diversification. For the sake of brevity, 
we focus on the specific combination of a 30% credit quota and a 2-40 US$/ton CO2 credit price collar. 
Panel C of Figure 4 illustrates that wind investments over time under this policy design are very close 
to the investment pattern in an environment without offsets. A comparison to the wind investment 
share under an exclusive 30% quote in Panel A shows that the gain of adding the price collar in term 
of higher investment is particularly pronounced towards the end of the planning period. In fact, the 
addition of the price collar ultimately ensures a wind investment share of about 85% as in the case 
without REDD+. If we also look at the profit distribution for this policy scenario (Panel C of Figure 5), 
we observe that the peak width of the profit distribution is slightly increasing. This observation indeed 
indicates a beneficial risk diversification effect of the quota-collar combination, although the 
magnitude of this effect remains limited. Summarizing, the additional benefits from introducing both 
a quota and price collar are significant though of moderate magnitude.  
4 Conclusions and policy implications 
The positive outcome of the most recent climate negotiations (COP21) in Paris could well lead to 
renewed interest in linking existing emissions trading systems (ETS) and emerging offset schemes. In 
that respect, REDD+ offsets represent one source of low cost abatement options. Concomitantly, 
allowing forestry offsets from less developed and emerging economies into existing and new ETS can 
strengthen international cooperation. Yet, such a strategy has been met with the concern that it could 
entail the risk of crowding out low-carbon investments of ETS-covered entities. Therefore, we use a 
real options model to investigate the investment behavior of a firm which can comply by using REDD+ 
credits or permits. We particularly focus on the impact of different designs of linking the credits into 
the permit trading scheme.   
Our paper first investigates various scenarios of permit and offset price processes with differing 
volatility and correlation. The degree of correlation mainly depends on the pricing mechanism of 
offsets and whether it is market-based (then implying higher correlation with permits) or based on 
opportunity-costs, mainly reflecting forgone agricultural returns (reducing correlation). In a second 
step, we explore a broad range of policy design features, including offset quotas, price management 
mechanisms for permit and offset prices as well as a combination of both (all scenarios investigated 
and results are summarized in Table 5 below). 
Unsurprisingly, our results confirm the investment crowding-out effect when ETS-covered entities 
have access to cheaper REDD+ credits. Although renewables investment (here represented by a wind 
park of the size comparable to the existing coal-fired capacity of a typical firm) increases over time, the 
speed of transition and the magnitude of the investment frequency are higher when firms do not have 
the access to cheaper offsets that allow them to postpone the transition while still being in compliance. 
Yet, several important insights on price processes emerge from our results. First, low-carbon 
investment critically depends on price volatility. We find significantly more investment with lower 
volatility. On the contrary, highly volatile ETS and REDD+ prices entail a higher risk of carbon lock-in, 
as the transition to less carbon-intensive energy is delayed. In a nutshell, higher price certainty 
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incentivizes investment in the capital-intensive, yet low-carbon technologies. Second, wind investment 
also responds positively – though to a very limited extent – to the degree of price correlation. This 
reflects the risk diversification opportunity provided by lower correlation, which increases the 
attractiveness of postponing clean investments in the face of carbon price uncertainty, thus 
representing a benefit to society by offering a less risky transition pathway for decarbonizing energy 
supply.  
The choice of policy design has likewise essential implications. We first investigate different quota 
levels for REDD+ credits as it was implemented for CDM in the majority of existing ETS. Our findings 
confirm that lower quotas significantly reduce the crowding-out effect on wind investment. 
Interestingly, for low quota levels (for instance 5% and 10%) investment behavior is virtually identical. 
In addition, we show that access to offsets impacts positively the level of firm profits while reducing 
uncertainty. We then explore various price management provisions, also reflecting policy choices 
made – or being under discussion – in several jurisdictions. We find that a permit price collar with 
unrestricted offset access does not avoid the crowding-out of wind investment. Yet, applying the same 
price management instrument to REDD+ credits increases wind deployment significantly. We then 
propose a so far overlooked policy design combining a relatively high offset quota with a price collar 
for those REDD+ offsets. Interestingly, we show that such design leads to much higher wind investment 
and a level of wind deployment at the end of the period (almost identical to a regime without access 
to offsets). It also has a moderate but positive impact on firm profit levels. From a political economy 
perspective, this option has the advantage of limiting price intervention in the compliance market 
while ensuring a minimum return to REDD+ offset sellers.  
This implies for policy, that the risk-hedging benefits of allowing REDD+ credits into an ETS can be 
reaped without jeopardizing the transition to low-carbon energy supply. At the same time, it provides 
a good basis for linking carbon-reduction efforts in tropical nations with emissions trading activities in 
industrialized countries, thereby increasing climate finance for REDD+ and allowing for a more efficient 
decarbonization pathway. 
Linking REDD+ to existing carbon markets could thus be a promising approach to strengthen the global 
climate architecture, while potentially reducing the compliance costs of regulated entities. However, 
policymakers will have to pay close attention to the exact policy design, in particular considering offset 
quota, stabilization mechanisms for credit price as well as the appropriate mechanism to price REDD+ 
credits. Furthermore, REDD+ is only one source of potential offsets and even though the analysis 
presented in this study relies on calibration to prices and policy designs discussed in the REDD+ context, 
similar conclusions would apply to broader linking with offset schemes, e.g. from agriculture.   
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Table 5 - Overview of results of all scenarios of market and policy designs, volatility and 
correlation regimes 
Benchmark scenarios: no access to offsets 
Price process Results 
Δ Volatility Permits (low-
medium-high) 
- Higher wind investment with lower volatility of permit and 
offset prices  
- Offset price volatility drive investment results 
 
 Credits (low-
medium-high) 
Δ Correlation Market-based 
(high) 
- Higher wind investment with higher correlation (i.e. with 
market-based pricing of REDD+ offsets) 
 OC-based 
(low) 
Policy scenarios (price baseline: high correlation, medium volatility) 
REDD+ offsets 
quota 
Results 
5% - Wind investment decreasing in quota  
- At low quota levels (5-10%) investment behavior quasi identical and 
convergence to investment behavior without offsets at the end of period (but 
with a delay) 
- Firm profit levels increasing in quota 
- Profit distribution narrowing in quota 
10% 
30% 
50% 
Price 
management 
Results 
Permit price 
collar [5-40 
US$/ton CO2, 5% 
p.a.] 
- No/very limited impact on wind investment  
 
Credit price collar 
[2-40 US$/ton 
CO2, 5% p.a.] 
- Higher wind investment 
- Very limited impact on firm profit level 
REDD+ offset 
quota and price 
management 
Results 
Credit price collar 
[2-40 US$/ton 
CO2, 5% p.a.] and 
30% quota 
- Higher wind investment 
- Almost identical wind deployment than with no access to offsets at the end 
of period but slower transition speed 
- Moderate but positive impact on firm profit level 
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 Appendix 
 
Figure A1: Investment probability under different volatility regimes 
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